When faced with natural disasters, communities respond in diverse ways, with processes that reflect their cultures, needs, and the extent of damage incurred by the community. Because of their potentially recurring nature, floods offer an opportunity for communities to learn from and adapt to these experiences with the goal of increasing resiliency through reflection, modification of former policies, and adoption of new policies. A key component of a community's ability to learn from disaster is how community members perceive the causes of extreme flood events and whether there is risk of future similar events. Perceptions of causes of flooding, including climate change, may be influenced by experiencing a flood event, along with individual preferences for various policies put in place to help a community recover. Using data collected from two rounds of public surveys (n = 903) across six Colorado communities flooded in 2013, we investigate whether there is variation across causal understanding of flooding, and whether this variation can be linked to differences in proximity of damages experienced (personal property, neighborhood, or community). By analyzing these variables, along with other variables (time since flood, political affiliation, and worldview), this study improves our understanding of the factors that drive our beliefs about potential causes of floods, focusing on climate change. The findings suggest that the extent of damage experienced at the neighborhood and community levels can have a significant effect on the perceptions of climate change held by the public. In turn, these beliefs about climate change are positively associated with perceptions of risks of future flooding.
Introduction
In recent years in the USA, extreme flooding has caused exceptional damage and loss of life across communities in Florida, Louisiana, West Virginia, Maryland, Texas, South Carolina, and many more towns and cities over the past decade. Leaving catastrophic damage in their path, flood damages and recovery costs across the USA tally in the billions annually, a cost estimate that is likely increasing over time (Brody et al. 2008) . The potential impacts of climate change include shifts in climatic patterns, such as increasingly intense and damaging events across many regions of the world (Coumou and Rahmstorf 2012 Karl et al. 2009 IPCC 2007 . Population trends suggest that increasingly households are relocating to flood-prone areas, and this, coupled with potential increases in frequency, timing, and amount of precipitation due to shifts in climate present challenges to long-term flood management. Yet, individuals and communities may have the capacity to learn from, adapt to, and become more resilient to these climate-driven disasters. But the question remains whether those who directly experience damage from extreme climatic events, such as disastrous flooding, shift their causal understanding and beliefs based on their experiences, including whether they see climate change as a cause of the disaster event.
Understanding the drivers of climate change beliefs is critical, as beliefs about climate change influence public support of policies to address these issues, including local-level action aimed at adapting to and becoming more resilient to changes in climate. At the local level, governments are increasingly engaging with the public in managing risks (Albright and Crow 2015 Brody et al. 2008 Godschalk et al. 2003 . Public opinion about the causes of extreme events, including climate change, may motivate, or alternatively inhibit, local-level adoption of policies intended to mitigate extreme climatic risks (nunes Correia et al. 1998 Tierney et al. 2001 . At the local level, the impact of extreme flood events on risk perceptions and beliefs about the causes of the flooding could potentially bring groups of individuals together to push for policy changes (Sabatier and Weible 2007 Nohrstedt and Weible 2010) , or these same processes could widen the gap between local officials and the public, potentially impeding changes in policies. Analyzing public perceptions of causal understanding of floods can provide insight into potential paths forward in developing or revising flood management and recovery plans (Vari et al. 2003) .
The American public has demonstrated a weak understanding of causes and impacts of climate change (Brody et al. 2008 Henry 2000 . In the USA, beliefs about global climate change, considered a low salience issue, are highly politically polarized (McCright and Dunlap 2011a) . Sudden, extreme climatic events, particularly those that cause extensive damage, often garner increased public attention to issues surrounding climate change (Konisky et al. 2015 Sisco et al. 2017 , at least immediately after the disaster. However, it is unclear if these events motivate individuals to reassess, or alternatively, become even more firm in their (dis)beliefs about climate change. Long-term shifts in climatic patterns are often very difficult for the public to directly observe and tease apart from their experience with day-to-day weather fluctuations and seasonal variations (Kempton et al. 1996) . Directly experiencing extreme weather events may shape individuals' beliefs about the seriousness of climate change (Konisky et al. 2015 Egan and Mullin 2012) , even if the science linking global climate change to specific localized weather events is complex and uncertain (Spence et al. 2011) .
When making judgments about uncertainties such as those surrounding climate change, individuals may rely on experiential processing, one form of learning that draws on personal, direct weather and climatic experiences to form beliefs about climatic patterns. Analytic processing demands more rigorous assessment of a broader set of more abstract, often statistically based evidence, beyond direct individual experience (Marx et al. 2007 Myers et al. 2013 Ogunbode et al. 2017 Kahneman 2011 . Experiential and analytic processing may work in tandem, where direct experience is realized in the context an analytic understanding and vice versa. The literature on cognitive biases suggests that thinking based on individual experience may be more prone to biases in judgments based on framing, emotion, ease of access to information, and prior belief systems (Kahneman 2011 Fischhoff et al. 1982 , suggesting that weather events experienced by individuals may influence beliefs about climate change. As such, perceptions about future risks may change in response to directly experiencing an extreme climatic event, such as a flood (Brilly and Polic 2005 Wachinger et al. 2013) , and may partly be a function of memories of similar past events. Risk perceptions may depend on the intensity of the event remembered, the frequency and proximity of prior events experienced, and how recently the event occurred (Lindell and Hwang 2008) .
While damage from flooding to personal property, one's neighborhood, or one's community may influence how individuals perceive severity of future risks, it is less clear how these experiences affect climate change beliefs (Spence et al. 2011) . In a study of climate change perceptions, Konisky et al. (2015) found a positive effect of experiencing extreme climatic events on concern about climate change. A study by Borick and Rabe (2010) points to stronger beliefs about climate change among the public in the aftermath of storm events, but somewhat counter-intuitively, Brody et al. (2008) concluded that individuals whose homes are located within a floodplain have been found to perceive lower risks of climate change.
In a study in the UK (Spence et al. 2011) , individuals who reported experiencing floods showed (1) higher levels of concern about climate change and (2) were more certain about the existence of climate change, as compared with those who said that they had not directly experienced a flood. Their study relied on self-reported recent local flood occurrences did not differentiate whether individuals had experienced flood damage to their own property. Alternatively, Whitmarsh (2008) found that residents of the UK who had been flooded did not differ significantly in their beliefs about climate change compared with non-flooded individuals.
It may be that perceptions of climatic events, along with personal beliefs, drive perceptions about climate change risks more so than the direct experience of a climatic event itself (see, for example, Marlon et al. 2018) . In a study of four distinct regions in the USA, individuals made associations between experiencing extreme events and beliefs about climate change, but only in regions where the public already displayed high levels of belief in climate change (Zanocco et al. 2018) . The accumulation of evidence from these studies suggests that the relationship between experiences with extreme events and climate change perceptions remains muddy.
Does proximity of experience matter?
When an extreme flood occurs in a community, all residents are not affected equally. Some members of the community will suffer direct damage to their personal property, while others may experience damage to their neighborhood or community, but escape direct impact to their home. In terms of climate change beliefs, most studies to date have not attempted to tease out a more nuanced understanding of how direct experience with floods could impact individual climate change beliefs. For example, Konisky et al. (2015) linked responses to a national climate change perception survey (CCES) conducted with an extreme storm event database that was aggregated at the Weather Forecasting Office (WFO). Using the WFO aggregation did not enable the authors to examine smaller-scale phenomena (personal or neighborhood effects) that may be important in understanding risks and climate change beliefs. Similarly, in a study by Spence et al. (2011) of the link between experiences of flooding and climate change beliefs and behavior, survey respondents were asked whether they had experienced a flood in their local area but did not ask about personal or neighborhood experiences.
Scholars have attempted to tease apart these associations in recent studies. Akerlof et al. (2016) found that projected risk scores of future coastal flooding and inundation were associated with perceptions of sea-level rise at the respondent's property and neighborhood in a study of sea-level rise in Maryland. Work by Howe et al. (2014) also suggests that individual reports of their experiences with extreme climatic events accurately reflect proximity and magnitude of such events. Brody et al. (2008) examined the relationship between location of home near coasts or in a floodplain and climate change beliefs and found that individuals near coasts perceived greater risks from climate change, but those located in a 100-year floodplain did not. While the climate change public opinion literature is unclear on these issues of proximity of experience, the flood risk perception literature may give us insight into these issues. In the wake of an extreme flood, individuals who have direct experience with the flood may overestimate the risk of future similar events (Ruin et al. 2007 ). Further, individuals who experience flooding in their communities but not to their own propertypotentially instilling in them a perception that they escaped the risk-may underestimate flood hazards (Wachinger et al. 2013 Meletti and O'Brien 1992) . The literature is unclear if these patterns hold in terms of climate change beliefs, as different from risk perceptions (Spence et al. 2011) , and is therefore worth examining further.
Ephemeral or lasting change in beliefs?
While some studies point to shifts in attention and concern about climate change in the wake of a potentially climate-related disaster, the literature is not settled on how long these changes last. While Konisky et al. (2015) found a moderate storm event effect on climate change opinion, this shift in public opinion dissipated through time. Similarly, in their study of effect of experiencing a heat wave of climate change beliefs, Egan and Mullin (2012) found that while occurrence of heat wave was associated with stronger beliefs about climate change, this affect also decreased over time. These findings align with the availability heuristic from the behavior decision theory literature that suggests that when humans make subjective judgments, we often pull from information that is most readily accessible to retrieve Kahneman 1973, 1974 ).
Demographics, political affiliation, trust, and worldviews
Many factors may be directly associated to climate change beliefs and/or mediate shifts in belief about climate change due to experiencing climatic-or weather-driven events. Such factors may include demographics such as gender (Akerlof et al. 2015; McCright and Dunlap 2011b) and education (Egan and Mullin 2012 ), political ideology (McCright and Dunlap 2011a Ogunbode et al. 2017 , and cultural worldviews (Shao 2016 Kahan 2012 Goebbert et al. 2012 . Goebbert et al. (2012) , for example, found that political ideology and culture influences perceptions of local weather, while Akerlof et al. (2013) determined that cultural worldviews are significant in predicting perceptions of sea level rise. Further, the impact of experiencing weather events on climate change beliefs may be mediated by these variables. For example, Egan and Mullin (2012) show that the effects of experiencing heat waves on climate change beliefs is mediated by education, with individuals with lower education levels demonstrating a higher level of belief change in response than more highly educated individuals.
A number of studies have shown that beliefs about climate change in the USA, its causes, and the seriousness of climate change impacts split along political ideologies and partisan lines (McCright and Dunlap 2011a, b; Dunlap and McCright 2008) , with individuals that affiliate with the Republican party less likely to view climate change as a serious threat. The study by Ogunbode et al. (2017) showed that, to some extent, shifts in beliefs about climate change in response to experiencing an extreme weather event was similar across political affiliation, but willingness to act on climate change, such as through adoption of behaviors to reduce energy use, differed across political party affiliation. These results suggest that the effect of an extreme flood event may vary across demographics, including political affiliation. The expected directions of these influences on climate change beliefs include a positive effect for females, a positive effect for higher levels of education, and a negative effect for Republican affiliation.
The effects of disaster often occur heterogeneously across and within communities, with disadvantaged individuals and low-resourced communities often bearing a disproportionate burden of damages, which suggests that risk perceptions may show similar heterogeneous patterns.
Disaster damages frequently worsen pre-existing inequities in access to resources and proximity to environmental hazards (Agyeman et al. 2003 Tierney 2007 . Within the USA, studies point to race as an influencing factor of risk perception, with white males perceiving lower risks compared with white women and African American men and women (Flynn et al. 1994) . The mechanisms explaining this BWhite Male Effect,^are not fully specified (Kahan et al. 2007 ) but may be attributed to gender and racial inequalities (Olofsson and Rashid 2011) and depend on levels of racial and ethnic acculturation (Johnson 2011). But differences in risk perceptions across race still persist, even when trust in and access to political authority have been controlled (Kahan et al. 2007; Satterfield et al. 2004) .
Based upon the literature summarized above, we expect that personal experience with an extreme flood event and demographic traits may increase belief in climate change by individuals, but that these belief changes may also be temporary. Based on these findings we posit:
Hypothesis 1 (personal damage): Individuals who have experienced direct flood damage to their personal property will demonstrate (1) higher levels of concern about climate change, (2) greater belief that climate change is causing harm, and (3) see a stronger causal link between climate change and an extreme flood, as compared with those who did not experience direct damage. Hypothesis 2 (neighborhood and community damage): Individuals who have experienced direct flood damage in their neighborhood and community will demonstrate (1) higher levels of concern about climate change, (2) greater belief that climate change is causing harm, and (3) see a stronger causal link between climate change and an extreme flood, as compared with those who experience lower levels of neighborhood and community damage. Hypothesis 3 (temporal): Holding other covariates constant, individuals surveyed closer in time to the extreme flood events will demonstrate (1) higher levels of concern, (2) greater belief that climate change is causing harm, and (3) perceive a stronger causal link between climate change and an extreme flood, as compared with those who were surveyed further in time from the flood.
Hypothesis 4 (demographics, political ideology and worldviews): Demographics, including gender and education, political affiliation, and worldviews will directly affect and/or moderate the effects of experiencing extreme flooding on climate change beliefs. All else constant, females, Democrats, and college graduates are expected to holder stronger climate beliefs than males, Republicans, and those with less formal education. Hypothesis 5 (flood risk perceptions): Community members with (1) greater concern about climate change, (2) greater belief that climate change is causing harm, and who (3) see a stronger causal link between climate change and an extreme flood, will perceive greater risks of extreme flooding in their communities, as compared with community members who have weaker beliefs about climate change.
The research methods are presented next, with a focus on the disaster case used in this analysis, data collection, and data analysis methods used.
Methods
In September 2013, much of Colorado's Front Range metro area was inundated by a rare extreme precipitation event. In some areas, rainfall over several days exceeded average annual precipitation amounts. The subsequent flooding left many communities dealing with a range of damages to housing, wastewater and drinking water supplies, and transportation infrastructure. Over nearly 3 years, we followed seven communities in three Colorado counties, Boulder, Larimer, and Weld, which were the hardest hit counties in terms of damages (Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 2013), to understand their flood recovery processes and characteristics (Online Resource Table 1 ).
In 2016 and 2017, we conducted a random survey of residents in six flood-affected communities 2 in Colorado (Dillman et al. 2014) . To develop the sampling frame for the resident survey, geographic information system (GIS)-based databases of residential parcel ownership and 2013 flood inundation maps were collected when available for each of the three counties in which the six communities are located. When flood inundation maps were not available, inundation was estimated from municipal floodplain maps and combined with aerial photos when available. Areas of flood inundation were confirmed with media reports and information from community websites. This flood inundation data served as one measure of physical flood exposure in our analysis. The inundation data only captured flooding from the 2013 event and not any subsequent flooding that occurred between the extreme flood and the survey dates. Minor flooding, particularly during spring runoff did occur in some areas during the intervening years, but no flood events occurred of the magnitude or spatial extent of the 2013 flood. In addition to the flood zone data, a measure of neighborhood/community damage (calculated at the zip-code level) was calculated using post-flood damage reports conducted by the FEMA. 3 To calculate zip-code level damage, average damage to damaged households ($) was calculated from Average FEMA damage of inspected households, owned and rented properties combined.
From each of the GIS databases, 500 residences in each of six communities (Boulder, Longmont, Lyons, Estes Park, Loveland, and Evans) were randomly selected across two stratifications: residences inundated and not inundated by the 2013 flood. In each community, 150 residences were sampled from flood inundated areas and 350 from non-inundated zones in each year. These samples were stratified as such to help ensure an overall sample of flooded households would be adequately large to detect differences in beliefs across flooded and nonflooded households. As such, residents in flooded zones were oversampled to help ensure that flooded residents completed the survey. Residents received three or more mail contacts inviting them to participate in an online or paper survey. A total of 903 responses were collected across the six communities, an overall response rate of approximately 17% (Online Resource Table 2 ).
In the prior section, we presented hypotheses that include a number of variables that we measured in the resident survey. The surveys included a series of questions regarding (1) climate change beliefs adapted from the Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Survey (2015), (2) perceived damages resulting from the floods, (3) perceived future flood risks, (4) home and personal demographics, and (5) ecological worldviews (New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) measures) (Dunlap et al. 2000) . The survey measures used in this analysis are listed in Table 1 (climate change beliefs, flood damage, and cultural worldviews) and respondents' demographic measures are summarized in Online Resource Tables 3 and 4. Demographics include (1) Republican party affiliation (Republican), (2) gender (male), (3) home ownership (own), (4) home value (home value, categorical measures 1-4), and (5) respondent lives in a single-family home (house). The survey responses were combined across the two waves (2016, 2017) of the study and analyzed using random and fixed effects (community) models including ordered logistic and multiple linear Interfere Strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5) Humans will eventually know enough about how nature works to be able to control it.
Control
Strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5) How bad was the damage from the September 2013 flood to your personal property?
Damage personal No damage (1) to total loss (7) How bad was the damage from the September 2013 flood to your neighborhood?
Damage neighborhood
No damage (1) to total loss (7) How bad was the damage from the September 2013 flood to your community?
Damage community
No damage (1) to total loss (7)
Climatic Change (2019) 155:1-17 Table 2 Ordered logit models with community random effects predicting measures of climate change belief Coefficients (standard errors) of the models are reported *Significance at an alpha level of 0.10; **significance at an alpha level of 0.05; ***significance at an alpha level 0.01 regression. Patterns of survey item missingness are listed and discussed in Online Resource Tables 5  and 6 . The models presented in Tables 3 and 4 were run with list-wise deletion. Due to potential bias from listwise deletion of rows containing missing data that are not missing completely at random, multiple imputation of missing data was employed. Multiple imputation was conducted using chained equations (MICE) in STATA 15 (Royston and White 2011) to develop five imputed datasets. The chained equations variables used in the multiple imputation are listed in Online Resource Table 6 . For the models using multiply imputed data, the individual models were run on each imputed dataset and combined following the procedures outlined by Rubin (1987) . Results from the multiple imputation models and the original list-wise deletion models were generally consistent. Model results from the multiple imputation are shown in Online Resource Tables 7 and  13 .
Results

Response variable: climate beliefs
To form the primary outcome variable, climate beliefs, we examined three questions in the surveys that sought to measure the respondent's belief about the seriousness of global climate change and role as a potential contributing factor of the 2013 Colorado flood (Table 1) . Each of the questions captured beliefs about climate change through the use of a Likert Scale, with summary statistics shown in Online Resource Table 4 . Spearman rank correlation coefficients were calculated across the three variables and high strength of linear relationships were found (r(cause, problem) = 0.71; r(cause, harm) = 0.68); r(problem, harm) = 0.84). Based on the calculated Cronbach's alpha of 0.912, responses of the three climate measures were combined (additive function) into one variable: climate beliefs (Online Resource Fig. 1 ). 
Hypothesis 1: direct experience with a flood
We posited relationships between directly experiencing damage from the 2013 flood to personal property and to climate change beliefs. We measured damage experienced from the flood through a series of three survey measures that asked, on a 7-point scale, the extent to which the respondent experienced damage to their personal property, neighborhood, and community (Table 1 ). Summary statistics of these variables, which ranged in scale from no damage (1) to total loss (7), are shown in Online Resource Table 4 . In addition to these measures, a binary measure, location within/outside of the flood zone, was formed based on a GIS analysis of spatially explicit 2013 flood zone/floodplain data from each of the communities. Further, a measure of zip-code level flood damage was calculated (average damage ($K) per damaged household in a zip code) from Federal Emergency Management Agency data and median house value ($K). To understand the relationship between experiencing flood damage from the 2013 flood and beliefs about climate change among the public, five random effects ordered logit models were developed using listwise deletion (Table 2 ) and multiply imputed data (Online Resource Table 7 ). Four of the models included controls for demographics, the year of survey response, and political affiliation, and one model (model 5) only included direct measures (year, flood zone location, and FEMA-reported damage (zip code). Demographics include gender, education (college graduate or not), home value, whether respondent owns their home, and whether their home is a single-family house. As a check of model specification of models in Table 2 , ordered logistic models with clustered standard errors (community) were also developed and are shown in Online Resource Table 8 . These results are generally consistent with those displayed in Table 2 . For additional interpretation, a table of average marginal effects of each predictor on the probability that climate beliefs is equal to 15 is listed in Online Resource Table 9 and shown in Online Resource Fig. 2 .
The results presented in Table 2 (and Online Resource Table 7) show little evidence in support of H1, which posited that direct, personal damage experienced with flooding is associated with an increase in concern about climate change. Neither the survey measure of personal flood damage experienced, nor location of residence in the flood zone were found to be statistically significant predictors of climate beliefs in the series of random effects ordered logistic models. The demographic predictors male (negative), and Bachelor's degree (positive) were found to be statistically significant and aligned with expectations in direction from the literature related to the White Male Effect and education levels. The predictor year will be discussed in later hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2: neighborhood and community-level flood experiences
Unlike the measure of personal damage experienced in models in Table 2 (and Online  Resource Table 7 ), the measures of perception of community damage was found to be a significant positive predictor in three models. Perception of neighborhood damage was found to be significantly and positively related to climate change beliefs in Model 1 in Table 2 (and  Online Resource Table 7 ). The measure of zip-code level damage reported by FEMA was found to be positively associated with climate belief in three of the models. These results suggest that the perception of community flood damage is significantly associated with climate belief, a measure of belief that climate change is happening, severe, and poses a future problem, in partial support of hypothesis 2. Individual household damage is not a significant predictor of these climate change beliefs, but rather, damage measured at broader zip code, and perceived at community scales is associated with these beliefs. Model 5 includes only those variables that captured the directly measured physical component of flooding (average zip-code damage as measured by FEMA and household flood zone location) and year of survey completion. As demonstrated by the higher AIC value, model 5 is much weaker at explaining climate beliefs compared with the other models that included perceptions of damage, demographics and worldviews.
Hypothesis 3: temporal component
With increasing time between flood occurrence and survey response, one might expect the effect of experiencing extreme floods on climate change beliefs to decline between the 2016 and 2017 survey. The models listed in Table 2 (and Online Resource Table 7 ) provide support for Hypothesis 3. Holding covariates constant, on average, individuals who responded to the survey in 2016 (3 years after the flood) held stronger beliefs in climate change links to the flood and future risks from flooding, as compared with individuals who responded in 2017, 4 years after the flood.
The means of the climate belief index and reported damage were found to be greater in 2016 than in 2017 (Online Resource Table 10 ). To develop this analysis further, random effects ordered logistic models were developed on separate 2016 and 2017 data subsets (Online Resource Table 11 ). In the 2016 model, the perception of damages to personal property, neighborhood, and community were found to be positively marginally statistically significant at an alpha level of 0.10, 0.01, and 0.001 respectively, whereas only community damage was found to be a significant predictor of climate belief in 2017 (alpha level 0.001). FEMA measured damage was found to be statistically significant predictor of climate belief in 2017. These results suggest that relationships between perception of flood damage and beliefs in climate change may be stronger closer in time to the event. These findings reflect those in a previous study by Konisky et al. (2015) which found that the climate change beliefs after an extreme event weakened through time. It should again be noted that the survey was only able to capture the perceptions during years three and four after the extreme event, and did not measure beliefs in the immediate aftermath of the flood.
Hypothesis 4: demographics, political affiliation, and worldviews
We also posited that demographics (gender, education) and worldviews are related to climate change beliefs. Model 4 in Table 2 (and Table 7 Online Resource) displays a random-effects ordered logistic model predicting beliefs about climate change. Worldview is measured by the New Ecological Paradigm survey questions in Table 1 (Dunlap et al. 2000) . Political affiliation and two of the ecological worldview measures (interfere and modify) are highly significantly associated with climate change beliefs, with those respondents with Republican Party affiliation showing a weaker belief in climate change.
Analyses suggest that political affiliation moderates the effect of experiencing flood damage on climate change beliefs. Separate random-effects models by political affiliation were developed (Table 2 , models 6 and 7). For respondents who do not affiliate with the Republican Party, perceived level of damage to their community was significantly positively associated with increased belief in the climate change variables outlined above, but this finding was not found to be statistically significant in the Republican model (Table 2, model 6; Online Resource Table 7 , model 6). Interestingly, in the multiply imputed Republican model (Online Resource Table 7 , model 6) there was a significant positive relationship between FEMAmeasured damage at the zip code level and beliefs about climate change. It is important to note that Republicans reported significantly less neighborhood damage than non-Republicans (Online Resource Table 12 ), bringing into question whether Republicans were less exposed to extreme flooding or whether Republicans experienced the same neighborhood damage as Democrats, but systematically reported less damage. To test whether Republicans experienced systematically less damage from the flood than non-Republicans, a Pearson Chi-Square test was run to calculate dependence between political affiliation and residential location in a flood zone, as determined by a GIS analysis. The Pearson Chi-Square test (χ 2 = 0.2332, p = 0.629) suggests a lack of dependence between political affiliation and flood zone location. This suggests that that Republicans may experience, perceive, and/or report systematically less damage than non-Republicans, even if they were at the same risk of flooding based on their location.
Hypothesis 5: flood risk perceptions
In our final hypothesis, we posited that greater concern and belief about climate change would be linked to perception of greater risks to one's community from extreme flooding. To test these relationships, a fixed effects multiple linear regression model was constructed to predict respondent perception that an extreme flood will occur in the next 10 years in the respondent's community. The respondents were presented a slider from 0 to 100, and they were instructed to move the slider to represent their perceived risk of a future 100-year flood (Online Resource  Fig. 3 ). Fixed effects multiple linear regression models are displayed in Table 3 and Online  Resource Table 13 , in which climate belief serves as an explanatory variable in the model. The climate beliefs variable was found to be a positively and but only marginally significant predictor of flood risk perception. FEMA measured flood damage (zip code level) and perception of community damage were statistically significant predictors. Unlike in the climate change belief models above, political affiliation was not statistically significant (recognizing that it may be affecting risk perceptions indirectly through the climate change beliefs variable). Interestingly, flood risk perceptions were significantly greater in 2017 than in 2016, holding covariates constant.
Discussion and conclusion
Over the past decades, the USA has experienced a number of extreme flood events affecting many regions of the country. How the public perceives risks and causes of flooding may impact the extent to which local communities learn and adapt from these disasters to reduce their future risks from extreme floods. The literature suggests that individuals whose communities have been affected by extreme climate-or weather-related events will demonstrate an increase in concern about climate change in the wake of the event. The literature remains unclear how proximity to extreme events influences climate change beliefs. In this paper, we examined how residents (N = 903) in six communities that were affected by the devastating Colorado 2013 flood perceive the seriousness of climate change and its potential causal link with the flood to better understand (1) the proximity or scale at which residents were affected (household, neighborhood, and/or community) and how this impact may affect climate change beliefs, and (2) how demographic variables, political affiliation, and beliefs about climate change may impact perception of future risks.
The findings from this study suggest that experiencing a flood does have an effect on climate change beliefs, aligning with previous findings of Konisky et al. (2015) and others. However, interestingly, we found that direct experience with a flood causing household damage is not significantly associated with climate change beliefs 3 and 4 years after the flood. But rather, it is the perception of increased neighborhood and community damage that is related to a greater belief in climate change (and its links to the floods and future flood risks), holding all else constant. This runs counter to the findings of Demski et al. (2017) who found that direct flood experience was associated with greater perceived climate change risks. A few possible explanations may explain our potentially counterintuitive finding. First, the 3-to 4-year time lapse between the extreme flood event and administration of the survey may have not captured any immediate effect of the flood on climate perceptions, in line with the temporal decay found by Konisky et al. (2015) and Egan and Mullin (2012) . By not surveying in the immediate years following the flood, any positive effect of household damage on climate change beliefs may have been missed. Second, it may be possible that those who live on a floodplain may have chosen to locate there, in part, because they do not believe in a threat of future climate change, a potential type of self-selection bias. Third, the effects of climatic change are often observed and discussed at a more expansive scale (e.g., global, regional) than at the narrower household level. It may be that individuals who experience and perceive broad neighborhood-and community-scaled effects of flooding may be more likely to associate those experiences and perceptions with the large-scale phenomena of climate change, as compared with those who did not experience or perceive wide-scale flood damage, all else constant. Conversely, those individuals who interpret the flood experience through a climate change frame may be more likely to perceive greater flood damages at a broader scale. The model predicting community risk perception based on climate change beliefs in Table 3 may present preliminary evidence in support of this logic. Fourth, much of the risk literature suggests that risk perceptions are formed through social processes (Slovic 1987 Kasperson et al. 1988 ). Overall, problem severity and causal attribution of the flood may be influenced by informal and formal discussions of the event and information acquired from media and other sources. Perceptions of neighborhood and community damage are also likely to be formed, at least in part, through similar social processes and information exchanges. These processes may potentially lead to a broader (scale) understanding of the flood which in turn may be more closely associated with climate change beliefs as compared with direct individual household experience. These findings may speak to the power of collective experiences, rather than experiences felt independently.
This study moves beyond prior literature to analyze the degree to which proximity of personal experience with an extreme flood event predicts beliefs about climate change, the likelihood that climate change is causing harm, and whether or not climate change is a problem. Damage to one's community or neighborhood appears to be more powerful in shaping perceptions about climate change than individual experience. As expected, political affiliation was found to be a highly significant predictor in all models predicting climate change beliefs; however, this was not true for the model predicting perceived future flood risk. Further, political ideology influences how disaster experiences affect climate change beliefs. This finding aligns with the work of Ogunbode et al. (2017) who found that political affiliation moderates the impact of flood experience on climate change mitigating behavior. However, careful attention should be paid to the measurement of flood experience when studying its impact on climate change beliefs. Whereas, Ogunbode et al. (2017) captured flood experience of the respondent's local area, others, such as Demski et al. (2017) , measured direct flooding to personal property. To more clearly understand the role of proximity or scale of experience, we incorporated two direct measures of flood experience (location in floodplain, average flood damage in a zip code), beyond self-reported damage assessments. We found that damage at the zip-code level as measured by FEMA was positively associated with climate change beliefs. Our findings demonstrate that how flood experience or damage is conceptualized and measured matters in terms of its demonstrated impact on climate change beliefs. Our study suggests that the proximity of flood damage is important to consider in terms of its effect on climate change beliefs.
Finally, belief about climate change was found to be a marginally significant predictor of perceived future flood risk. This suggests that as communities recover from flooding, perceptions of future risks may differ within a community depending on perceptions of severity of community-level flood damages and beliefs about climate change, which in turn are associated with political ideology, among other factors.
